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The possession of property, owned or leased, is more than an is-
sue of shelter-it is a defining element of our lives.' Property owner-
ship influences the way we feel about ourselves as well as how we are
perceived by those around us.2 Even more significantly, how and
where we live affects our ability to access other goods equally.3 In this
way, property divides us into a world of haves and have-nots, deter-
mining people's social position on the basis of a single factor.
Property ownership also has obvious implications on an individ-
ual's ability to be part of a physical community. Communities are the
places where people come together and also where they frequently
conflict. Within communities, people live in close proximity to, learn
from, and interact daily with one another. Decisions about where,
who, and what to live near are often based on stereotypes. These
choices, which can lead to communities segregated by race or class or
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See MICHELLE MILLER-ADAMS, OWNING UP: POVERTY, ASSETS, AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 23
(2002) ("Most Americans say that owning a home helps them make a better life for their chil-
dren .... And homes represent an asset that can be borrowed against to finance an education,
start a business, or cushion a family from economic crisis.").
2 One of the most illustrative examples of this phenomenon comes from an examination of
the effects of home ownership on the self-concept of lower-income rural women. One inter-
viewee explained:
I guess the biggest thing is that it made me feel like I had achieved something. From the
time that I moved out of mom and dad's, this was the first time I had been out on my
own and taking care of my kids by myself. Knowing that I could take care of them and
me and give them a nice place to live made me feel real good. [I] was on my own and
knew that I could make it. I didn't have to depend on my parents or a husband ....
Now I don't have to, and even if I don't have a man, I know I'll be okay.
Nicole D. Breazeale, Enabling Low-Income, Rural People in Appalachia to Buy Their Own
Homes and Secure Quality Housing: The Effects of Tenure, Housing Quality, and Action on
Feelings of Self-worth and Self-Competence 43 (2002) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
Kentucky) (on file with author).
s See CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES 7
(1996) ("Housing discrimination is an especially urgent social problem not only in and of itself
but also because it is an underlying cause of other pressing ills in American society.").
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both, reverberate through nearly every facet of American life. In this
way "[r]acial isolation practically ensures.. . inequalities in educa-
tion, employment, culture, personal networks, freedom from crime,
and the many other opportunities, amenities and freedoms that are
related to location. The interaction of classism and racism makes ra-
cial isolation in neighborhoods... both socially destructive and diffi-
cult to remedy."4 While some people have little to no choice about
where to live, those with greater flexibility will frequently either make
consciously race-based decisions or else view segregation as irrele-
vant.5 Generally, "the bases of exclusion tend to reflect selfishness,
wealth, or ethnicity rather than a unique preference for particular lo-
cal public goods or an idiosyncratic, but benign, lifestyle."6
Communities, then, become representative of the biases and
prejudices people continue to hold. Moreover, because these are
private, personal decisions, this is not treated as discrimination.7
Communities are generally free to preserve the rights of property
above the rights of individuals. Indeed, this self-selection has become
a defining element of what it means to be part of a community-
"[o]ne of the salient characteristics of community life is the capacity
to exclude along lines that are selected by the community itself.""
The gulf between cities and suburbs rests on divisions of race and
class and choices about who is or is not an appropriate neighbor.
Suburban residents in particular "have been very ready to do what-
ever has seemed necessary, including spending large sums of their
own money, to keep the disadvantaged at bay, to make them forbid-
den neighbors."9 This self-perpetuated isolation, in turn, leads to less
interaction with-and therefore the ability to ignore or overlook-
major social issues and problems. While there is "hope that interra-
cial contacts will reduce racial conflict and discrimination,"' the real-
ity is that those who can will typically opt to surround themselves with
neighbors who reflect their own race, social class, status, and back-
ground." The result is even greater divisions between urban and
4 Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 289, 303 (2002).
5 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Mediating Institutions: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction:
Courts, Covenants and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1376 (1994) ("[Clritiques of local-
ism . . view the pursuit of a common vision of the good life as inherently exclusionary.").
Id.
7 See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (holding that pre-
serving the peace and comfort of a community is a valid, reasonable legislative classification).
Gillette, supra note 5, at 1380.
DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA 6 (1995).
10 W. DENNIS KEATING, THE SUBURBAN RACIAL DILEMMA: HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS 7
(1994).
See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 64 (1986). The Thornburg Court stated:
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suburban communities. "Since not all individuals can live where they
prefer, decentralization for the select few will encourage them to seek
isolation from the fiscal and physical burdens of urban life instead of
working for the improvement of the larger community.'
2
Legal scholars and social scientists have written volumes on the
impact of race and class on communities and the problems of white
flight, gated communities, and suburban sprawl.'" All of these issues
are connected to the essential question of whether it is constitutional
to preclude certain individuals from living in a particular community
on the basis of characteristics such as race and class. If community is
as essential to our civic and political life as many social theorists say,14
then exclusive communities continue to perpetuate blatant social
segregation in a way that has been ruled unconstitutional in nearly
every other public setting.
Part I of this Comment examines some of the legal and social sci-
ence arguments for the value of diversity in community settings, and
the significance of membership to individual and community success.
In addition, Part I explains the practice of exclusionary zoning and its
discriminatory effect. In Part II, I consider the Supreme Court's
holdings on zoning as well as the situation in Mount Laurel, NewJer-
sey, created by exclusionary zoning practices. I argue that state courts
are not a proper forum for addressing the harm of legally enforced
segregation. Finally, in Part III, I offer an argument that exclusionary
zoning should be held unconstitutional because of the state's in-
volvement in discrimination. In conclusion, I propose an expansion
of the Equal Protection Clause to reflect the growing correlation be-
tween racism and classism in America.
[M] embers of geographically insular racial and ethnic groups frequently share socioeco-
nomic characteristics, such as income level, employment status, amount of education,
housing and other living conditions, religion, language, and so forth .... Where such
characteristics are shared, race or ethnic group not only denotes color or place of origin,
it also functions as a shorthand notation for common social and economic characteris-
tics.
ld.
I1 Gillette, supra note 5, at 1376.
15 See, e.g., RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND HOW IT'S
TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 320 (2002) ("[Olur society is
divided along class lines-divides that are being etched ever more deeply into the American
economic landscape as a result of growing geographic segmentation. In every region across the
country, cities and suburbs are increasingly balkanized into communities of haves and have-
nots.").
14 See, e.g., ROBERT 0. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000) (examining social capital, or the value of social networks and reciprocal
relationships to the success and vitality of community). See also FLORIDA, supra note 13, at 324:
Strong communities, not any institutions within them, are the key to social cohesion. As
group attachments break down, the community itself must be the social matrix that
holds us together .... With everything else in flux---companies, careers, even families-
our communities are often the only real constants in the social equation.
Nov. 20031
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I. WHY PLACE MATTERS
A. Diversity is an Essential Element of Quality of Life
Academics have been trying for years to quantify the significance
of place, and to determine how people make choices about where to
live. Jane Jacobs has asserted that "[a] city's very wholeness in bring-
ing together people with communities of interest is one of its greatest
assets, possibly the greatest.'' 15 Richard Florida has created a method-
ology to quantify what he calls "quality of place." This analysis con-
siders the extent to which a city has the characteristics and amenities
valued by people with options about where to live. 6 One of the most
important elements of "quality of place," he found, was diversity."
Most people want to live places where they will have access to a wide
variety of experiences and amenities. Florida's research shows that
"regional economic growth is powered by creative people, who prefer
places that are diverse, tolerant and open to new ideas. Diversity in-
creases the odds that a place will attract different types of creative
people with different skill sets and ideas."'8 Regional economic suc-
cess is directly connected to the quality of communities, with special
emphasis on three factors: technology, talent, and tolerance. 9 As
Florida discovered, "Each is a necessary but by itself insufficient con-
dition: To attract creative people, generate innovation and stimulate
economic growth, a place must have all three."
2 0
If we can improve the dynamics within communities, building
more diverse and vibrant spaces for people to live and work, then ar-
guably we will be much closer to having a more inclusive society. The
Supreme Court acknowledged this in 1954 in Berman v. Parker:
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread
disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by
reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They may in-
deed make living an almost insufferable burden. They may also be an
ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which
makes it a place from which men turn. The misery of housing may de-
spoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a river.
... The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
15 JANEJACOBs, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 119 (1961).
16 FLORIDA, supra note 13, at 231-32.
17 Id. at 233 ("Successful places do not provide just one thing; rather they provide a range of
quality of place options for different kinds of people at different stages in the life course.").
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community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
21clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled .
Cities "trapped by their past" that "don't get it" will not only become
less desirable places to live, but will also fail in a highly competitive,
modem economy. Conversely, "diverse and open communities have
compelling competitive advantages in stimulating creativity, generat-
ing innovations and increasing wealth and economic growth. The
key is... building social cohesion in an era defined by diversity, high
rates of mobility, weak ties and contingent commitments.
2 3
Like Florida, Jacobs claims that both socially and economically,
cities depend on diversity and its effects.24 Jacobs argues that fears of
mixed uses and diversity mistakenly prompted cities to fight against
diversity. "These beliefs help shape city zoning regulations .... They
stand in the way of planning that could deliberately encourage spon-
taneous diversity by providing the conditions necessary to its
growth." 5
B. The Discriminatory Nature of Exclusionary Zoning and Its Development
The work of FloridaJacobs, and others6 sharply contrasts with the
trend in modem zoning regulations, which in many cities is centered
on keeping people out rather than allowing them in. 7 This divisive-
ness at the community level represents the social issues and problems
that continue to plague our country. "Discrimination and exclusion
from land violate the nation's professed beliefs in social responsibil-
ity. Making affordable housing ... a reality in the lives of minorities
is thus a battle to define the character of a society ....
Professor and legal scholar Margaret Radin characterizes property
as personhood, suggesting that certain kinds of real property become
part of our identity because of their intrinsic value to us. If property
21 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) (citation omitted).
22 See FLORIDA, supra note 13, at 302-03.
23 Id. at 323.
24 SeeJACOBS, supra note 15, at 14 (discussing "the need of cities for a most intricate and
close-grained diversity of uses that give each other constant mutual support, both economically
and socially").
25 Id. at 222.
26 Another particularly relevant example of this is the New Urbanist movement, which ex-
plicitly denounces the income segregation of communities and of neighborhoods within com-
munities. See, e.g., ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000).
27 SeeJACOBS, supra note 15, at 408 ("The ruthless, oversimplified, pseudo-city planning and
pseudo-city design we get today is a form of 'unbuilding' cities.").
28 HAAR, supra note 3, at 10.
29 See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982) ("[To
be a person] an individual needs some control over resources in the external environment.
The necessary assurances of control take the form of property rights.").
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is so essential to self-definition, then excluding people from property
ownership is the equivalent of denying them both an identity and any
significant membership in American society. The legal connection
between property ownership and the right to vote, for example, was
assumed for years. 30 This reiterates the fundamental point that prop-
erty ownership defines a person's value and determines place in
American society. Exclusionary zoning presents a legal mechanism to
affirm this conclusion and make discrimination acceptable.
Zoning emerged in the early twentieth century as a way for con-
servative, middle-class property owners to protect their current and
future land interests. 3 P Zoning laws went further than restrictive
covenants. Beyond making private land use restrictions legally en-
forceable, zoning represented a new form of lawmaking specifically
intended to protect private property rights. The original and mod-
em rationale for zoning is the same: to restrict the private property
rights of some landowners in order to secure the private property
rights of others.3 Today, however, the choices about whose rights are
restricted often have a discriminatory purpose.
Exclusionary zoning is the use of a local zoning ordinance to
promote housing segregation. Specific practices can include limita-
tions on nonresidential uses or types of housing, restrictions on
maximum building or number of occupants, or requirements for
minimum lot sizes, building setbacks, or floor areas.4
"[E]xclusionary zoning has the effect, and often the purpose, of in-
creasing housing costs, which inevitably reduces the number of af-
fordable units for low-income persons." 5 Essentially, this means ex-
clusionary zoning is a form of legally enforced segregation based on
"reasonable"36 justifications for maintaining the particular character-
30 The Supreme Court has only begun recently to consistently hold that property ownership
is not an appropriate requirement. See, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (holding that apportioning votes on the basis of land ownership in
local general elections passed a rational basis test and creating an exception to the one-person,
one-vote principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).
31 Harvey M. Jacobs, The Impact of State Property Rights Laws: Those Laws and
My Land, LAND USE LAW. & ZONING DIG., Mar. 1998, at 3-8, http://www.planning.org/
LULZD/propertyrights.htm.
32 Id.




The standard for evaluating legislation of this kind, which does not trigger strict or even
intermediate scrutiny if the justification is not race, gender, alienage, or national origin, is
merely whether the classification is reasonably connected to the achievement of some legitimate
governmental interest. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
("The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classifi-
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istics of a given community. Race and class, if not explicit or if under
the guise of another, more legitimate reason, can be used as accept-
able bases for exclusion through zoning ordinances. While exclu-
sionary zoning policies are not obviously proof of racism, this is fre-
quently both their ultimate purpose and effect.3 7  Thus, in many
suburban communities, "[]aw has become a surrogate for physical
walls.""'
C. The Intersection of Race and Class in the Context of Property Ownership
Communities are important, in part, because of the great signifi-
cance of property to American life. What does it mean to have prop-
erty? To not have it? Perhaps even more crucial is what lies between:
substandard housing,39 or the people Curtis Berger refers to as the
"pre-homeless. 4 ° In 1999, the average cost of renting a house was
$580 per month.4 Over fourteen million U.S. households spend
more than half their income on housing.42 Three out of ten house-
holds have trouble affording their housing. 43 Over nine million
households are in living situations classified as overcrowded or physi-
cally inadequate.44 Households with one person employed full-time at
minimum wage cannot afford to rent a one-bedroom apartment any-
where in the U.S.45 There is a severe housing shortage among the
lowest wage earners, where the demand exceeds the supply by two
million .46
It is also important to consider the strong correlation between
race and class in property ownership. Those who cannot afford ade-
quate housing, or any housing at all, are disproportionately members
of disadvantaged minority groups. In 2001, the homeless population
was estimated at 50% African-American, 35% White, 12% Hispanic,
cation drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."). The low stan-
dard of this rational basis test means that nearly any proffered reason will be found acceptable.
37 See HAAR, supra note 3, at 5 (explaining that minorities are substantially excluded from
suburban communities through the employment of discriminatory home ownership practices).
38 Id. at 8.
29 See Curtis Berger, Beyond Homelessness: An Entitlement to Housing, 45 MIAMI L. REV. 315, 316
(1990-91) ("While concern for the homeless is both fashionable and correct, to direct our at-
tention only toward the homeless leaves untouched, and may draw attention from, a systemati-
cally far deeper national dilemma-that of housing indigency.").
40 Id. at 321 (borrowing a term used by Professor Stephen Wizner to describe low-income
households teetering on the edge of homelessness).
41 Id.
42 JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S HOUSING
25 (2003).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 26.
45 Id. at 27.
46 Id.
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2% Native American, and 1% Asian.47 In contrast, the 2000 census
showed that the U.S. population overall is 12.5% Hispanic and 12.1%
African-American. s Caucasians, on the other hand, represent 69.1%
of the overall U.S. population.49 According to the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, in 2000, the Caucasian home
ownership rate was 73.8% while the total minority homeownership
rate was only 48.1%.50
Issues of race in America are intricately connected to those of
class. When people make decisions about whom to include or ex-
clude, race and class may trigger equal fears about a possible disinte-
gration of community life. This means that "[d]istinguishing racism
from classism is no easy matter. Racial isolation in neighborhoods is
over-determined. With race and income highly correlated, minorities
and the poor are often the same people and thus the targets of both
racism and classism."51 Most zoning decisions, which stem from the
government, are made by a predominantly homogenous group of in-
dividuals2 and have significant racial undertones (if not overtones) .S
In this way, "rights in property are contingent on, intertwined with,
and conflated with race.
II. EXCLUSIONARY ZONING IN THE COURTS
A. Zoning in the Supreme Court
While the U.S. Supreme Court has explored a number of related
issues (poverty as a suspect classification, the fundamental right to
housing, the extent of liberties included under the Fourteenth
Amendment, etc.), it has never specifically ruled on the constitution-
ality of exclusionary zoning that has a classist or racist purpose. Be-
fore moving to the argument that the Court can and should find it
47 U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN
AMERICA'S CITIES 2001, at ii (Dec. 2001).
48 2000 U.S. Census Data, http://www.census.gov (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
49 Id.
50 Model Local Strategies Help Low-Income, Minority, and Immigrant Households Become Homeown-
ers, 6 URBAN RESEARCH MONITOR (U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev./Office of Policy Dev.
and Research, Wash., D.C.), http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/urm/urm-092001/
urm.html (Sept./Oct. 2001).
51 Schuck, supra note 4, at 302.
52 See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1721 (1993) ("Pos-
session-the act necessary to lay the basis for rights in property-was defined to include only
the cultural practices of whites. This definition laid the foundation for the idea that white-
ness-that which whites alone possess-is valuable and is property.").
53 Id. at 1791 ("[The concept of whiteness as property] has thwarted not only conceptions of
racialjustice but also conceptions of property that embrace more equitable possibilities.").
4 Id. at 1714.
[Vol. 6:2
(UN)EQUAL PROTECTION FOR THE POOR
unconstitutional, I will first examine the case law that supports this
conclusion.
In its earliest affirmation of exclusionary zoning, the Court held in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. that it was permissible for a city to
zone out apartment buildings and other industrial uses in favor of
preserving peace and comfort in a given community.55 The Court
commented on the substantial community interest of keeping resi-
dential areas free of "disturbing noises," "increased traffic," the dan-
gers of "moving and parked automobiles," and "depriving children of
the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in
more favored localities. 5 6 Without any further analysis of the effect
that this would have on community membership, the Court found
these interests sufficiently compelling to warrant the exclusion 5
Euclid clarified that creating gated communities was acceptable and
that at least some forms of exclusionary zoning would be viewed as
valid, reasonable legislative classifications.
In Warth v. Seldin, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to
rule on exclusionary zoning practices explicitly based on race or
class. 5 8 The plaintiffs, primarily a group of lower-income individuals
who had been prevented from residing in the town, claimed that the
zoning ordinances effectively excluded persons of low and moderate
income, in contravention of their constitutional rights and in viola-
tion of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983.59 The ordinance allocated
98% of the town's vacant land to single-family detached housing.60
Additionally, requirements relating to lot size, setback, floor area,
and habitable space increased the cost of single-family housing be-
yond the means of persons of low and moderate income.6' Further-
more, the town allocated only 0.3% of the land available for residen-
tial construction to multifamily structures (apartments, townhouses,
and the like), and even on this limited space, housing for low- and
moderate-income persons was not economically feasible because oflow ensiy an oth r "62
low density and other requirements. Petitioners alleged that the
town and its officials had made "practically and economically impos-
sible the construction of sufficient numbers of low and moderate in-
come.., housing. 63 Finally, petitioners argued that "the town's zon-
ing practices also had the effect of excluding persons of minority
55 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
56 Id. at 394.
57 Id.
58 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
59 Id. at 493.
60 Id. at 495.
61 Id.
62 Id.
Id. at 496 (citation omitted).
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racial and ethnic groups, since most such persons have only low or
moderate incomes."
64
Instead of dealing with the substantive issues at hand, the Court
held that the plaintiffs had no standing to challenge zoning regula-
tions.6- Warth v. Seldin demonstrated, in part, that the entry barriers
to federal litigation on exclusionary zoning matters are quite high.
These barriers generally convince litigants to bring their claims in
state courts and to base their arguments on state constitutional
rights.66 The issue of standing made central by Warth continues to
pose problems for plaintiffs seeking to challenge exclusionary zoning
practices under federal law.6 7 Standing rests on whether the plaintiff
has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy" 68 as to warrant his or her invocation of federal court jurisdic-
tion and justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers on his or
her behalf.69 A federal court's jurisdiction can be invoked only when
a plaintiff has suffered "some threatened or actual injury resulting
from the putatively illegal action."
7
In response to the question of whether any constitutional or statu-
tory provision granted these plaintiffs a right to judicial relief, the
Court stated, "[N]one of these petitioners has a present interest in
any Penfield property; none is himself subject to the ordinance's
strictures; and none has ever been denied a variance or permit by re-
spondent officials."71 A thwarted desire to live in a particular com-
munity, even if this desire stemmed from proximity to work, family,
or an interest in living in a better neighborhood, was found to be too
indirect an injury to support an actionable causal relationship. Be-
cause the plaintiffs could not prove that the housing would meet
their needs, they had no basis for challenging their exclusion from
this particular community.73 The Court did clarify, however, that this
holding only applied to the specific facts at hand.
Because of the fundamental importance of property ownership, a
denial of the choice of where to possess property creates a substantial
4 d.
65 Id. at 504.
Harold McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclusionary Zoning, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 623, 624 (1987).
67 Id.
Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
69 Id. at 498-99.
70 Id. at 499 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)).
71 Id. at 504.
72 Id. at 503-07.
73 Id. at 506 & n. 16.
74 See id. at 508 ("We hold only that a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning
practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm
him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention.").
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injury. The definition of injury used in evaluating standing for cases
of this kind should include emotional harm.75 Since "[h]ousing is
among Americans' most important sources of enjoyment, security,
and emotional well-being, 7 6 unfair and/or overly restrictive limita-
tions on people's ability to access adequate housing affect every as-
pect of their lives. Having the ability to decide where to live is central
to obtaining future opportunities-better schools, more employment
possibilities, and a higher quality of life. Moreover, zoning restric-
tions harm entire communities by preventing them from experienc-
ing the diversity that is essential to life in America s.7  Economic injury
should not be the only kind of injury sufficient to support a plaintiffs
standing.7' As the dissent in Warth acknowledges, "A clean, safe, and
well-heated home is not enough for some people. Some want to live
where the neighbors are congenial and have social and political out-
looks similar to their own."s ° People's sense of comfort and stability
should be as critical as their physical security, for it is as determinative
of their future potential.8"
An additional problem in current zoning jurisprudence is the
tremendous deference given to local governments in the area of
property law. "Of all the powers held by the local sovereign, that of
land-use control is deemed most sacred by its citizens. Property law
has always been regarded as the province of local government, and
interference in the daily zoning of land kindles towering pas-
sions . .,82 While local governments may be the most efficient en-
tity to oversee land-use and property allocations, they also generally
75 See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 376-378 (1982) (holding that under the
liberal federal pleading standard, plaintiffs had standing for emotional and/or economic in-
jury, including "the right to the important social, professional, business and economic, political
and aesthetic benefits of interracial associations that arise from living in integrated communi-
ties free from discriminatory housing practices") (citation omitted).
76 Schuck, supra note 4, at 291.
77 Id. at 303. See also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 64 (1986) ("The opportunity to
achieve high employment status and income, for example, is often influenced by the presence
or absence of racial or ethnic discrimination.").
78 See Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 376-378 (holding that injury caused by the denial of the
benefits of living in an integrated community could suffice for standing and remanding claims
to the district court for further determination of the extent of plaintiffs' injury).
79 SeeVill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1977) ("It
has long been clear that economic injury is not the only kind of injury that can support a plain-
tiffs standing.").
s0 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975).
81 This correlation is acknowledged by conservatives and liberals alike. See, e.g., Akhil Reed
Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 37, 38 (1990) ("[T]he problem of poor people is that, in a real way, they have no wills of
their own .... They lack some minimal stake in society sufficient to connect their own personal
interests with that of the larger public interest.").
82 HAAR, supra note 3, at 30.
Nov. 2003]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
represent a narrow set of interests." The current residents of a given
community make zoning decisions, which means there is no voice for
those who have been or would like to become residents.84 In this way,
towns are free to perpetuate communities that represent not America
as a whole, but their own particular version of what constitutes an ap-
propriate community. This is in direct contrast to constitutional pro-
tection for freedom of association8 5 and guarantees of equal protec-
tion under the law.86 Zoning has become a constitutionally
acceptable form of segregation and overt discrimination against the
poor and racial and ethnic minorities.87 Zoning laws condone people
choosing among and judging others on the basis of characteristics
that have been deemed invidious in other realms of law.m
B. Zoning at the State Level: The Story of Mount Laurel, New Jersey
Mount Laurel, NewJersey, has become the unfortunate model for
exclusionary zoning, demonstrating exactly what happens when sup-
posedly neutral restrictions function as sieves, sorting out those who
will continue to be granted status as community members and those
who will not. Mount Laurel, originally a small agricultural town situ-
ated a convenient distance from the major industrial centers of Cam-
den, New Jersey, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, grew exponentially
as conditions in the cities worsened 9 In the 1960s and 1970s, outsid-
ers from the cities flocked to Mount Laurel, due in part to the con-
struction of major highways and roadways leading through or near
83 See KIRP ET AL., supra note 9, at 7 ("[T] he rules of government and a rigged private market
have greatly eased the way for white and middle-class families while shutting the door on mi-
norities.").
8 Id. at 8.
85 See U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
87 See, e.g., KIRP ET AL., supra note 9, at 8 ("Zoning has been the chief instrument by which
suburbs have held themselves apart from the poor. .. ").
88 Perhaps the closest analogy is to school desegregation, where courts and the public have
vehemently declared that separate is not equal. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954) (holding that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal"). Shutting school
doors on minority children is now against the law, but enacting barriers preventing families
from moving into the neighborhoods where those schools are located is not.
89 See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 718 (N.J.
1975) ("Mount Laurel 1") (providing a factual and historical overview of the circumstances sur-
rounding the case).
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the township.s Those with the money to purchase land and homes,
and the means to commute to and from jobs located outside the
town's limits, became the self-selected residents of burgeoning Mount
Laurel.
These population changes led to explicit zoning ordinances that
helped the new white, middle- to upper-class residents of Mount Lau-
rel feel protected from the urban blight, poverty, crime, and racial
conflicts they had left behind in nearby cities.9' Yet the issue was not
merely the theoretical exclusion of minorities and the poor. Mount
Laurel already had a significant, long-standing population of lower-
class and minority residents who suffered directly because of the deci-
sions of their newer, wealthier neighbors.2 Ironically, Mount Laurel,
once a haven for freed slaves given the first land of their own by
Quakers," came to represent some of the most contentious intersec-
tions of race and class that still divide America.
When lawyers entered the scene, they found that many African-
American families had resorted to living in renovated chicken coops
and shacks.94 Community reaction, however, was that "[t]hese fami-
lies needed housing, not lawsuits. , 95 The mayor of Mount Laurel had
told members of a mainly African-American congregation, "'If you
people can't afford to live in our town, then you'll just have to
leave.' 9 6 Increasingly, the town leaders created a vision that did not
include any poor or non-white individuals and used zoning to achieve
this end. Residents found themselves being forced out, regardless of
how long they had lived in Mount Laurel or their level of investment
in the community. Because of the deeply rooted values of property
ownership and, in particular, the power of alienation, it was difficult
to see how the situation in Mount Laurel could change. Indeed,
without the intervention of the courts, it is hard to imagine that con-
ditions today would be any different.
97
90 Id.
91 See KIRP ET AL., supra note 9, at 47 ("From the outset, zoning in Mount Laurel was a way to
exclude people regarded by the residents as undesirable.").
92 Id. at 41-42.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 42-44.
95 Id. at 56.
96 Id. at 2.
97 It must be noted that even after legal mandates, the process of change in Mount Laurel
has been slow and far from smooth. Litigation has continued to this day because of the diffi-
culty of enforcing the Mount Laurel rulings and the town's persistence in trying to find ways
around following the letter of the law imposed by the Mount Laurel decisions. See Fair Share
Hous. Ctr., Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 802 A.2d 512 (NJ. 2002); S. Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); Toll Bros., Inc. v. Township of
W. Windsor, 756 A.2d 1056 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). See also McDougall, supra note 66,
at 629, which states:
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C. Mount Laurel I
In the first case challenging Mount Laurel's zoning practices, the
NewJersey Supreme Court found that the policies in use violated the
state constitution. For the purposes of New Jersey's equal protec-
tion clause, the poor are considered a protected class.y The court
also found a substantive due process violation for the guarantee of
housing as a fundamental right.'0 0 In now famous language, the court
wrote:
We conclude that every such municipality must, by its land use regu-
lations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate variety
and choice of housing. More specifically, presumptively it cannot fore-
close the opportunity of the classes of people mentioned for low and
moderate income housing and in its regulations must affirmatively afford
that opportunity, at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of
the present and prospective regional need therefor. These obligations
must be met unless the particular municipality can sustain the heavy bur-
den of demonstrating peculiar circumstances which dictate that it should
not be required so to do.'
10
The first Mount Laurel case ("Mount Laurel I') clarified that it was not
constitutionally acceptable for cities to deny access to an entire class
of people and that local governments had a responsibility to ensure
that this did not happen. However true the language of the Mount
Laurel I opinion rang, the lasting trouble was with enforcement and
how to reconcile long-standing biases, tensions, and divisions. 0 3 The
court's finding that every municipality has an obligation to provide a
"reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of
housing"0 4 and "may not adopt regulations or policies which thwart
or preclude that opportunity, ,10 did not solve any of the existing
Mount Laurel I was largely a theoretical decision providing rights without addressing the
more complex issue of remedies. The facially simple remedy suggested by the hold-
ing.., required exceedingly technical and esoteric information, thus making it easy for
groponents of exclusionary zoning to tie up a court proceeding in argument over details.
Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d 713, 734 (N.J. 1975).
9 Id. at 731.
100 Id. at 724.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 727 ("It is plain beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing of all
categories of people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare re-
quired in all local land use regulation.").
103 Schuck, supra note 4, at 368:
A court demanding the implementation of a diversity ideal that a neighborhood's
residents do not share, and will strenuously resist, cannot conscript the housing market
to do its bidding as it might be able to conscript a public bureaucracy .... A court that
mandates this diversity over such resistance is bound to impair its legitimacy and effec-
tiveness.
104 Mount Laurel 1, 336 A.2d at 728.
105 Id.
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problems. Moreover, the decision focused largely on the "adverse ef-
fects on general welfare, not on its racially discriminatory effects," 10
perhaps burying the intended message.
The Mount Laurel cases were unique because first lawyers and then
judges intervened in decisions normally left to local governments.
10 7
The courts stepped in to decide a question of priorities and deter-
mined that a person's fundamental interest in making choices about
where and with whom to live had to be limited for the greater good
of all people.10 8 "What makes the Mount Laurel dilemma so poignant
is that the court's crafting of one principle-the ideal of equality of
opportunity regardless of race, ethnicity, or income-clashed with
another highly valued article of faith: people's deeply rooted belief
in their right to defend bastions against would-be invaders."0 9 This
clash, however, was especially complicated because it meant that legal
mandates were not strong enough to change attitudes and behaviors
based on firmly held beliefs.
D. Mount Laurel II and the Aftermath
Because Mount Laurel Idid not have the intended effect of actually
persuading officials or residents to change their ways, the township
found alternatives to maneuver around meeting its obligation to pro-
vide housing for lower-income people."' While the message of Mount
Laurel I was clear, the court had not been explicit about what would
constitute a "fair share""' of the duty to assume part of the regional
burden and provide land designated for housing lower-income indi-
viduals. Two years later, the court clarified its intent in Mount Laurel
II. In strong language once again, the court held:
The basis for the constitutional obligation is simple: the State controls
the use of land, all of the land. In exercising that control it cannot favor
rich over poor. It cannot legislatively set aside dilapidated housing in ur-
ban ghettos for the poor and decent housing elsewhere for everyone else.
106 Schuck, supra note 4, at 310.
107 HAAR, supra note 3, at 3-4.
108 See, e.g., HAAR, supra note 3, at 10 ("The Mount Laurel Doctrine recognizes that in the
current urban-suburban setting, the search for freedom and equality is still tied to land, that the
age-old connection continues, in the modern version of suburbia, to be vital and indispensable.
Mount Laurel's rules govern entry to that land.").
109 Id. at 9.
110 See S. Burlington Co. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 410 (N.J. 1983)
("Mount Laurel II'T) ("We have learned from experience, however, that unless a strong judicial
hand is used, Mount Laurel will not result in housing, but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and
appeals.").
I This concept is dealt with in more detail in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madi-
son, 371 A.2d 1192, 1200-01 (N.J. 1977), which explained that fair share obligations need not be
precise or based on a particular judicial formula in order to be fair, and which left discretion to
the local authorities.
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The government that controls this land represents everyone. While the
State may not have the ability to eliminate poverty, it cannot use that
condition as the basis for imposing further disadvantages. And the same
applies to the municipality, to which this control over land has been con-
stitutionally delegated.
Mount Laurel II denounced developing municipalities for passing bla-
tantly exclusionary zoning laws intended to disproportionately affect
lower-income people and criticized the state legislature for failing to
protect the constitutional rights of all citizens. After commenting
that Mount Laurel I had had no demonstrable effect on the township
and its practices whatsoever, the court proceeded to discard most of
the general language from Mount Laurel I in favor of highly specific
rules that municipalities and lower courts would have to follow in or-
der to meet their burden. 14 This time, the court mandated that in
addition to eliminating excessive zoning, subdivision restrictions, and
other measures limiting the construction of affordable housing,
"[a]ffirmative governmental devices should be used.., including
lower-income density bonuses and mandatory set-asides. Further-
more, the municipality should cooperate with the developer's at-
tempts to obtain federal subsidies."' Rather than merely allowing
for the construction of low- and moderate-income housing, this deci-
sion held that municipalities must proactively encourage it.
Mount Laurel H also urged the state to get involved, which it did
several years later by passing its own Fair Housing Act"6 and creating
the Council on Affordable Housing for the purposes of assigning and, 1 1 7
reviewing municipalities' fair shares. Even these measures have had
limited success. In a 1997 study, only 7% of the lower-income house-
holds questioned reported having moved from the cities to the sub-
urbs in the aftermath of the Mount Laurel decisions."8 Sixty-six per-
cent of those who moved were Caucasian, 23% were African-
American, 2% were Latino, and 9% classified themselves as other."9
Additionally, 21% of the suburban African-American households sur-
veyed made the reverse move, from suburbs to cities. 20 While migra-
tion totals overall are disappointingly low, the Mount Laurel decisions
may, if anything, have had the effect of increasing residential segrega-
112 Mount Laurel I, 456 A.2d at 415.
11 Schuck, supra note 4, at 310-11 (citing Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 410).
14 Id. at 311.
15 Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 419.
16 Fair Housing Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to 52:27D-329 (West 2001).
117 See id. §§ 52:27D-305 to 52:27D-307 (establishing the Council and describing its duties).
118 Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Impact of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An Analy-
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tion by race. 1  The decisions seem to have encouraged more whites
(albeit lower-income whites) to move to the suburbs.
While the situation in Mount Laurel is perhaps the best known
and most litigated example of exclusionary zoning, other courts and
legislatures have struggled with similar questions. 2 In Pennsylvania,
courts have held that exclusionary zoning is impermissible when it re-
stricts reasonable growth and interferes with the rights of landowners
to alienate their property.123  California courts have recognized that
zoning decisions cannot be left to the "exclusive control of self-
interested municipalities" 124 and have adopted a more regional ap-
proach. The essential problem everywhere remains the same: how to
control discrimination and segregation in communities without fed-
eral constitutional authority prohibiting tactics like exclusionary zon-
ing.
E. Why Remedies in State Court Are Not Sufficient
The outcome of the Mount Laurel cases demonstrates exactly why
remedies in state court are not a sufficient method for prohibiting
exclusionary zoning. Using the state constitution as authority for the
holding that suburbs have an obligation to make it realistic for those
in poverty to find housing has only perpetuated, rather than chal-
lenged, the discriminatory nature of these practices. As important as
the Mount Laurel decisions are,12' they have not been taken seriously
enough, and enforcement measures by state courts have failed to
adequately protect the interests of those being harmed by their con-
tinued exclusion. While the cases and decisions have received plenty
126of attention, issues of accountability and implementation have lim-
ited the results of the litigation. Many are skeptical that any court
121 See id.
12 See Schuck, supra note 4, at 318-19 ("Other states have attacked exclusionary zoning in a
variety of ways, yet they too have had little effect.").
123 See, e.g., Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Providence, 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1978).
124 McDougall, supra note 66, at 635.
125 See, e.g., HAAR, supra note 3, at 10 ("In a society dedicated to equality of opportunity, the
Mount Laurel decisions must be understood as among the most significant judicial decisions of
our time."). See also KIRP ET AL., supra note 9, at 9 ("What the New Jersey judges said in their
Mount Laurel opinions about the obligation of suburbs to make it 'realistically possible' for poor
families to find homes there represents the most important zoning decision since the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled, nearly three-quarters of a century earlier, that zoning itself was constitu-
tional.").
126 See, e.g., Angela Couloumbis, "Mount Laurel"Decision Getting Another Look, PHILA. INQUIRER,
May 28, 2002, at Al; Anthony DePalma, Mt. Laurel: New Path to Old Goal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
1983, § 11, at 1; Jan Hefler, For Suburban Poor, Few Welcome Mats, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 5, 2002,
at B9; AndrewJacobs, Justices Pondering Old Barriers in Housing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at D5.
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decision could change this. 1 2  However, a reinterpretation of what
the federal Constitution already protects might make more of a dif-
ference. For example, a holding by the Supreme Court that local or-
dinances enforced by state actors that limit and/or exclude lower-
income residents violate the Fourteenth Amendment could have a
broader impact and result in significant social and policy changes.
s1 2
Indeed, this could be the only measure, short of federal legislation,
that would change the way race and poverty are treated in the context
of property ownership and community membership.'9
III. AN EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT FOR FINDING
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A. The Equal Protection Clause, Race, and Poverty
To find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, one must demonstrate a substantial disparity be-
tween the government's treatment of similarly situated individuals or
the government's denial of a fundamental right to a particular group
127 See KEATING, supra note 10, at 242 ("Barring the advent of a much different national ad-
ministration, one determined to attack suburban residential segregation in the courts as viola-
tive of federal fair housing law, it is most unlikely that the courts can be a vehicle for systemati-
cally addressing suburban integration problems."); id. at 4 ("Litigation against selected suburbs
accused of exclusionary practices has not had the intended effect of persuading other suburbs
to adopt affirmative policies to avoid similar legal problems or of leading to federal or statewide
legislative action to mandate affirmative fair housing policies."); Schuck, supra note 4, at 309:
[M]ost Americans do not regard classist exclusions, as distinguished from racist ones, as
a social problem. They do not think it unjust if people live only in communities that
they can afford. Second, the law permits communities to pursue a variety of legitimate
purposes (e.g., limiting pollution or congestion) through zoning techniques that some-
times have intended or unintended exclusionary effects. This means that even in a
community that bars zoning for classist purposes, an effective legal challenge must show
that the community's facially neutral, ostensibly legitimate purposes are in fact a pretext
for a classist one.
2 This is, of course, a point that many more skeptical of the Supreme Court's power would
dispute. See, e.g., Peter Edelman, Responding to the Wake-Up Call: A New Agenda for Poverty Lawyers,
24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 547, 549 (1998) ("Going to court and invoking the Constitu-
tion to bring about basic change for the poor is a non-starter.... That a single Supreme Court
ruling nine to zero can establish racial or economic justice as the law of the land is a romanti-
cized picture of litigation."). While law may not be the only answer for social change in this
area, it is indisputably part of the solution.
12 See, e.g., KEATING, supra note 10, at 221:
In a nondiscriminatory society, race-conscious policies would not be necessary to pro-
mote greater racial harmony and neighborhood racial diversity and to reduce racial dis-
crimination in housing. However ... there continues to be considerable racial separa-
tism and housing discrimination in the United States, despite the passage of national,
state, and local fair housing legislation.
See also Schuck, supra note 4, at 289 ("Using the law to promote diversity in residential comml-
nities is probably more difficult than promoting it in any other public policy domain.").
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of individuals as members of a class.13 0 To trigger strict scrutiny and
warrant an extremely close look at the government's proffered rea-
sons for the classification, there has to be a restriction of choice by a
state actor on the basis of a protected characteristic. 1 3 ' To date, race
is the only classification that triggers strict scrutiny.3 2 Because of the
strong correlation between race and poverty in America, 3 3 it is time
to start viewing class-based restrictions as discriminatory and contrary
to the purpose of protecting individuals' liberty and freedom of
choice. 4 Equal protection is not limited in the Constitution solely to
race, 1 and it is critical to recognize the interconnected nature of
prejudice. 3 6 Local governments are not a sufficient safeguard against
the explicitly racist and classist decisions made in the context of hous-
130 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) ( "[I]f a law neither burdens a funda-
mental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it
bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.").
131 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A]ll legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.").
132 Gender still triggers only intermediate scrutiny, where the classification must serve "im-
portant governmental objectives" and the means employed are "substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives." United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000). Gender
and race both warrant a higher level of scrutiny than a mere rational basis test because they are
immutable characteristics. In turn, the Court has recognized the need for special protection
for individuals in these groups. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial in-
quiry.").
133 See Schuck, supra note 4, at 301-02:
Classism explains much residential segregation. Indeed, the distinction between
racism and classism is pivotal .... Although racism is categorically illegal in all but the
most private contexts, the law bars classism only when it works to deny voting rights, ac-
cess to the courts, legal counsel in serious criminal cases, and a few other basic incidents
of common citizenship. In all other respects, the law protects, or even permits, classism.
14 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 21 (1969):
For if money is power, then a class deliberately defined so as to include everyone who has
less wealth or income than any person outside it may certainly be deemed, as racial mi-
norities are by many observers deemed, to be especially susceptible to abuse by majori-
tarian process; and classification of "the poor" as such may, like classification of racial
minorities as such, be popularly understood as a badge of inferiority. Especially is this so
in light of the extreme difficulty of imagining proper governmental objectives which re-
quire for their achievement the explicit carving out, for relatively disadvantageous treat-
ment, of a class defined by relative paucity of wealth or income.
135 The relevant section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides merely that no state shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
136 SeeJames v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 145 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). While the ma-
jority held that wealth classifications alone do not trigger strict scrutiny, the dissent by Justice
Marshall,joined by Justices Blackmun and Brennan, argued, "It is far too late in the day to con-
tend that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only racial discrimination; and to me, singling
out the poor to bear a burden not placed on any other class of citizens tramples the values that
the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect." Id.
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ing; indeed, by refusing to intervene in "local" matters, states are both
perpetuating and enabling constitutional violations.
37
When the Constitution is interpreted so as to allow the state to ex-
clude a group of people on the basis of their economic status, some-
thing is wrong. When wealth-based exclusions disproportionately
harm racial minorities, then something is very wrong indeed. Class
discrimination is functioning as a pretext for race discrimination.
Because it is constitutionally permissible to exclude people based on
class, it has become constitutionally acceptable to also exclude racial
minorities who also happen to be members of a lower socioeconomic
class. Yet, without the pretext of class, these same actions would be
clearly unconstitutional. Racism in this way is hiding beneath the
significantly less-suspect guise of classism. To address this inequality,
a discriminatory intent to classify on the basis of class that results in a
significant exclusion of members of minority populations must be
held unconstitutional. In order to warrant the level of scrutiny
needed to prevent further discrimination of this kind, socioeconomic
status must be granted at least the status of a quasi-suspect trait. As it
stands, "[I]f a group of poor people mounted a federal constitutional
assault on restrictive zoning ordinances by alleging discrimina-
tion ... solely on the basis of economic status, their claim would be
held to lie outside the refuge of strict scrutiny, and the garden-variety
rational basis test would apply."38
To understand the problem with this, consider the following hy-
pothetical situation. A group of neighbors decide that in order to
preserve the safety, comfort, and quality of life in their community,
they wish to enact an ordinance that allows only members of their
particular racial group to live within the town's borders. As legiti-
mate reasons for enacting the ordinance, the group offers statistics
showing a correlation between crime and racial strife and point to
the harmony that children and adults in the community currently en-
joy. The town's zoning board, all current residents of the community
who benefit from the status quo, passes the ordinance. Because race
is the explicit purpose and effect of this ordinance, as long as state ac-
tion could be demonstrated in either the enactment or enforcement,
this would be a clear violation of the Equal Protection Clause.39 Yet if
137 The federal government has acknowledged the need for broader protections for racial
and ethnic minorities and has attempted to address it through legislation. One source of au-
thority comes from 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2002): "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, pur-
chase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
138 HAAR, supra note 3, at 23.
139 See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)
("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause."). See also Buchanan v. 'Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding that ordinances
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we altered the circumstances only slightly and based the explicit ex-
clusion on wealth and not race, even a result that effectively pre-
vented minorities from residing in that community would be held
constitutional.
In the United States today many lower-income individuals do not
have the right to claim community membership. But constitutionally,
racial and ethnic minorities do have a claim against exclusion from a
community by a state actor on the basis of their race. Should the ex-
plicit mention of race distinguish an ordinance that has the clear
purpose and effect of excluding members of disadvantaged racial and
ethnic groups from one that couches this in less specific language?
Must the racially discriminatory purpose and effect be explicitly
stated or is the effect, together with a clear analysis of the nature of
the deprivation, enough? Restrictions based on class that result in
discrimination against those of both a disadvantaged class and race
should be suspect enough to trigger strict scrutiny.1 °
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has grown increasingly
conservative over the last few decades, social and cultural changes
may force the Court to readdress these questions in the near future.
In particular, the growing income gaps and pervasive economic-based
inequalities in our society present compelling reasons for reconsid-
eration of the legal status of the poor in America. Even without des-
ignating that social class itself warrants strict scrutiny, purposefully
class-based restrictions that produce racially discriminatory effects
should justify a hybrid form of strict scrutiny, or at least the kind of
intermediate scrutiny triggered by gender as a quasi-suspect trait.
B. Reexamining the Equal Protection Clause and Its
Interpretation by the Modern Court
Although there is no direct constitutional support for a right to
live in the community of one's choice, there are a number of related
liberties and interpretations of the Constitution that can support this
conclusion. The Court has, in the past, recognized that class func-
tions do discriminate in a manner similar to race: "Lines drawn on
the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally dis-
favored. 1 41 Thus, employing a higher level of scrutiny when evaluat-
preventing the sale of residential property based on the race of the buyer and the racial compo-
sition of the block are unconstitutional).
140 See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 144-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It is rather an
explicit classification on the basis of poverty-a suspect classification which demands exacting
judicial scrutiny . . ").
1 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (citing Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), for the proposition that lines drawn on the basis of race are disfa-
vored).
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ing instances where regulations produce high correlations of dis-
crimination against both lower-income individuals and members of
racial minority groups would not be entirely radical. Historically, the
Court has also suggested that the notion of liberty may have to ex-
pand in order to protect the rights of individuals against infringe-
ment by the state:
In every case that comes before this court, therefore, where legislation of
this character is concerned and where the protection of the Federal Con-
stitution is sought, the question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reason-
able and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an
unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of
the individual to his personal liberty. .. ? 4
While cases in the 1970s held that those living in poverty are not a
protected class14 3 and that a fundamental right to property or ade-
quate shelter is not guaranteed by the Constitution,44 the nature of
property rights and the appropriate level of scrutiny have not been
decided by the Supreme Court. For the Equal Protection Clause to
control, either the fundamental rights strand or the suspect class
strand would have to apply to exclusionary zoning.
Since the suggestion in the 1970s that the Court was considering
the expansion of the Equal Protection Clause, there has been very lit-
tle litigation on this point. San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez clarified that the class of people living in poverty is not cur-
rently recognized under the Equal Protection Clause,'4 directly con-
tradicting the decision six years earlier in Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections holding wealth to be a suspect classification. 4 6 In Lindsey v.
Normet, the Court rejected an argument that there is a fundamental
right to shelter and home ownership and held that social importance
is not the critical determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict
scrutiny:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary
housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for
every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that docu-
ment any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular
quality .... Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate
142 Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
143 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19 (1973) (concluding that lower
courts have not satisfactorilyjustified subjecting wealth discrimination to strict judicial scrutiny).
144 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (finding no constitutional right to occupy
rental property without payment of rent and no constitutional guarantee of housing of a certain
quality).
145 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19.
146 Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.
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housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legisla-
tive, notjudicial, functions. 
14
Similarly, in Village of Arlington Heights,14 a contractor tried to pur-
chase land for building racially integrated low- and moderate-income
housing, and applied to rezone fifteen acres from single-family to
multifamily dwellings.'49 The village denied his request and the con-
tractor sued, claiming the denial was "racially discriminatory.' 150 The
Court found a discriminatory impact but not purpose. 5 ' Likewise, in
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, petitioners challenged a New York vil-
lage ordinance that restricted land use to single-family dwellings and
defined "family" very narrowly. 5 A group of students attending a
nearby university challenged their right to live together in one dwell-
ing.'53 The Court ruled against them, citing an interest in preserving
the character of the community.5 4 The dissent raised the important
point that "It]here [was] not a shred of evidence in the record indi-
cating that if Belle Terre permitted a limited number of unrelated
persons to live together, the residential, familial character of the
community would be fundamentally affected." 55  The Court's reli-
ance on finding a legitimate purpose for exclusionary zoning prac-
tices falters in these cases, but is not totally destroyed. The dissent in
Belle Terre argued that the guarantee of liberty in the First and Four-
teenth Amendments should protect an individual's freedom to
choose his or her associates
156 and to "establish a home.
57
More recently, the Court has suggested that the test of whether
the government is infringing on the rights of individuals should rest
147 Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74.
148 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
149 Id. at 254.
10 Id.
151 Id. at 270-71.
152 Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The ordinance "restricted land use to
one-family dwellings excluding lodging houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple-
family dwellings," defining "family" as "one or more persons related by blood, adoption, or
marriage, living... together as a single housekeeping unit .... " Id. at 2.
153 Id. at 2-3.
154 Id. at 9.
155 Id. at 20 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Our decisions establish that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments protect the freedom to choose one's associates."). See also NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 430 (1963) ("[W]e have affirmed the right 'to engage in association for the advance-
ment of beliefs and ideas.'" (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460
(1958))).
157 Vill. ofBelle Terre, 416 U.S. at 15 (Marshall,J., dissenting). See also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg,J., concurring) ("[T]he right 'to... establish a home ...'
[is] an essential part of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." (citation omit-
ted)); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("Without doubt, [the Fourteenth Amend-
ment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual
to ... establish a home ....").
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on "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and
the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. "15 If, in the case
of zoning, we consider that the state is acting through local zoning
boards through its grant of power and discretion, then the state
should be held responsible for infringing upon the rights of indi-
viduals.
C. Resolving the Requirement of State Action in Disparity of Treatment
Because the protection provided by the Fourteenth Amendment
is specifically limited to state action, it is necessary in any Equal Pro-
tection claim to assert that harm has been done by a party granted its
authority by the state.159 This means the state itself must participate in
either the implementation or the enforcement of discriminatory
measures. 60 Land use is generally governed by state law and zoning is
specifically delegated to local control.'61 However, the Court has also
ruled that "the power of the State to create and enforce property in-
terests must be exercised within the boundaries defined by the Four-
teenth Amendment.0 62 Decisions made by local zoning boards affect
the public at large. Furthermore, property rights emerge from the
state; therefore, the individuals entrusted with the power to delegate
how much and by whom property shall be used are acting under the
authority of the state. A state that assigns control over land-use de-
cisions to local officials cannot escape from state action merely be-
cause another body, to which it has passed its direct authority, has
perpetrated the discrimination.
Alternatively, to find state action, one could argue that state courts
that enforce explicitly discriminatory local zoning laws are function-
ing as state actors in upholding policies with a discriminatory purpose
158 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
159 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("The central purpose of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminat-
ing on the basis of race.").
160 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
creates no protection against merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrong-
ful).
161 SeeVill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389 ("[The village's local] governing
authorities, presumably representing a majority of its inhabitants and voicing their will, have
determined... that the course of... development shall proceed within definitely fixed lines.").
162 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
163 This situation can be analogized to the holding that state political parties, which were
given authority by the state, functioned sufficiently as government actors to be viewed as state
actors and therefore were within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (holding that the Texas Democratic Party's resolution excluding
African-Americans qualified as a state action and thus was in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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and effect, as was done successfully in Shelley v. Kraemer.164 The Court
in Shelley v. Kraemer held:
It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be pro-
tected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment
are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property. Equality in
the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the framers of that
Amendment as an essential pre-condition to the realization of other basic
civil rights and liberties which the Amendment was intended to guaran-
165tee.
While there is still no basis for finding a private decision to exclude
nonwhites from a particular neighborhood discriminatory, state ac-
tion enabling or enforcing these measures does come under the pur-
view of the Fourteenth Amendment. When zoning boards, given au-
thority by the state, approve of a deprivation that not only infringes
on individual liberty, but also is based on a clear discriminatory in-
tent, this qualifies as state action.
Past Supreme Court interpretations of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment used language such as "State laws and acts done under State au-
thority"; "State laws, or State action of some kind"; "such laws as the
States may adopt or enforce"; and "such acts and proceedings as the
States may commit or take." 66 These phrases are not a rigid defini-
tion of what constitutes state action; instead, state action would in-
clude laws adopted by officials granted the power to act with the
state's authority. 67 Indeed, Reitman v. Mulkey clarified that there is no
single test for when state involvement rises to the level of state action;
instead, this is a case-by-case determination based on particular facts
and circumstances. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority offers one
of the most expansive interpretations of state action, holding that ra-
cial discrimination by a tenant in a state-owned building sufficed as
state action. 6 9  What is obvious and remains unchanging in the
Court's opinions is that "[elqual protection of the laws is not
achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.'
70
1 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 1 ("The actions of state courts and judicial officers in their official
capacities are actions of the states within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment .... In
granting judicial enforcement of such private agreements in these cases, the states acted to deny
petitioners the equal protection of the laws. . . ." (citation omitted)).
165 Id. at 10.
1 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13, 14 (1883).
167 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that signifi-
cant state involvement in private discrimination could amount to unconstitutional state action).
18 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967).
169 Burton, 365 U.S. at 726.
170 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22.
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D. The Case for Finding a Fundamental Right to Shelter
A major argument against any sort of extraordinary constitutional
protection for the poor or guarantee of shelter is that the Constitu-
tion does not provide for these entitlements. 17' However, the Consti-
tution does provide for other entitlements, such as the right to work,
the right to vote, and the right to an education. 172 One argument is
that these entitlements differ in their effects on individuals.
Why has our political system balked at expressly recognizing "a right
to shelter," "a right to a minimum income," and other similar rights,
when for more than a century it has guaranteed self-ownership of labor
and a right to schooling?... The proposed entitlements tend to discour-
age work, while the existing entitlements tend to encourage it. 173
A lack of appropriate housing, which often leads to a substandard
education, level of civic participation, and ability to maintain a job,
also tends to discourage an individual from working. If the aim is
really to help build a more productive citizenry and further a sense of
individual responsibility, the benefits of property ownership and
community membership can be as valuable as anything else. Denying
people shelter or community membership on the rationale that these
amenities will discourage them from self-help is a fundamental mis-
conception about poverty. Moreover, it completely disregards the
sense of alienation that comes from being pushed out into ghettos
and other undesirable places to live-or having one's shelter com-
pletely taken away.171
Additionally, because housing is fundamental to meaningful and
productive participation in any kind of public life, "[a]ffordable shel-
ter must be seen as a fundamental right, as part of that entitlement to
an adequate standard of living that every humane society-certainly
one as fortunate as our own-should wish to assure every one of its
residents." 175 Whether one believes that the Constitution implicitly
holds a right to shelter in its mention of liberties and privileges of
citizenship or that Congress should enact a constitutional right to
shelter,"76 both support the notion that class-based discrimination is
inherently contrary to American ideals of freedom and inclusion.
171 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable Case for an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15
HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 32-34 (1992).
172 Id. at 30-32.
173 Id. at 32.
174 See Berger, supra note 39, at 335 ("Homelessness will not begin to recede until our gov-
ernment, the President and the Congress, look beyond the immediate crisis to the systemic
problems that have produced and will prolong it. To solve those problems, we must once again
regard affordable housing as everyone's right.").
175 Id. at 324-25.
176 See Ellickson, supra note 171, at 20 (referring to Curtis Berger's belief that Congress
should create a right to shelter).
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CONCLUSION
Because of the high correlation between having a lower socioeco-
nomic status and being a racial or ethnic minority in American soci-
ety, zoning ordinances that exclude lower-income people result in in-
tentional exclusion of minorities. This should be an explicit violation
of the Equal Protection Clause-it is time to expand the scope of ra-
cial classifications. Otherwise, the effect of exclusionary zoning is
state-enforced segregation, which has been deemed unconstitutional
in every other context.' 77 The value of property and significance of
community to one's opportunities should make it more, not less, im-
portant that federal authority govern discriminatory state action in
this area. The Constitution can and should be interpreted to protect
against exactly the kinds of violations that are passing under the guise
of exclusionary zoning.17  Moreover, even from an entitlements per-
spective, property is so fundamental that without it, people cannot be
expected to participate effectively. 7 9 In condoning zoning practices
that have the purpose and effect of discriminating against individuals
on the basis of their socioeconomic status, the state is sponsoring dis-
crimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Poverty produces many forms of inequality and
injustice; it should not result in total exclusion from a society based
177 For a look at the somewhat erratic decisions by the Court dealing with discrimination in
the context of communities, see Gillette, supra note 5, at 1377, who notes, "Our ambivalence
toward communities is apparent in an inconsistent and often disconnected series of constitu-
tional law decisions that sometimes allow, and sometimes prohibit, majority interference with
the practices and preferences of discrete ways of life."
178 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966):
Likewise, the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a particu-
lar era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never
been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted due
process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of fun-
damental rights .... Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause do change.
See also Berger, supra note 39, at 334 ("In the United States, we have neither embraced a domes-
tic constitutional right to housing... nor do we now profess that our citizens have 'the funda-
mental right, regardless of economic circumstances, to enjoy adequate shelter at reasonable
costs' .... ").
179 SeeAmar, supra note 81, at 37:
[A] minimal entitlement to property is so important, so constitutive, and so essential for
both individual and collective self-governance that to provide each citizen with that
minimal amount of property, the government may legitimately redistribute property
from other citizens who have far more than their minimal share. But wait-there's
more. The notion of minimal entitlements is not simply constitutive, it is constitutional-
not just constitutionally permissible, meaning that the government may distribute or re-
distribute to insure every citizen a minimal stake in society, but constitutionally obliga-
tory. The government must do so. The Constitution does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics, but it does enact Mr. Thaddeus Stevens's forty acres and a mule.
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on principles of freedom and liberty, nor should it serve as a justifica-
tion for America to remain separated by race and ethnicity.
